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experiment aims to evaluate, i. e., his inductive method; and consequently in the division of the pupils, capacity for inductive defining is favored. This objection becomes more serious in view of the fact that his tables show relatively slight and sometimes insignificant differences between the results of his two methods. But the book should serve as a stimulus to every student who is interested in the experimental solution of disputed questions in educational science.

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*Philosophie des Möglichen. Grundzüge einer Erkenntniskritik.* VON DR. JOHANNES MARIA VERWEYEN. Leipzig, Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1913. Pp. vii, 240.

The nature of possibility is discussed by the author in various connections, such as contingency with reference to the existence or non-existence of the universe as a whole, contingency in volitional conduct, and contingency in relation to physics, to historical method and to theology. With regard to contingency in general, he concludes that the most fundamental riddle is that of being *uberhaupt*. We are unable to grasp being in such a way that it is seen to include necessary existence. Contingency with reference to events within the existent universe is reduced to abstract or hypothetical modes of conception. As a consequence, indeterminism is ruled out of court, and it is shown that when disputes arise concerning the freedom of the will, the determinist argues from the standpoint of the really existent, whereas the indeterminist pleads for abstract variability, which means that with a different volition a different course of conduct will ensue. The question of conceivability is first distinguished from imaginability and is then decided by reference to a mind that possesses certain *a priori* potencies of thought, which is proved by the procedure of mathematics. It is conceded that the occurrence of miracles in the past can not be denied categorically, i. e., that a certain contingency of this kind in human affairs can not be proved to be impossible, but simply that the entire weight of historical evidence is against this supposition.

At various points in the presentation the reader has proper occasion to regret that the analysis is not pushed a step further. What, for example, is the nature of this stupendous riddle concerning being *an sich* or in the abstract? It is pertinent to inquire as to the conditions of any event within the universe, but when this inquiry is extended to the universe as a whole, are we becoming profound or merely foolish? If the wonder why something rather than nothing exists does not carry with it a reference to controlling conditions, what is its precise import? And similarly in the matter of miracles, if we do not assume an agency which does something, thus presupposing time, and which is yet non-temporal, what is the real point of the discussion? Problems of this kind solve themselves if we only succeed in giving a reasonably definite formulation of the point at issue. The nature of contingency is not to be decided by an appeal to abstract *Denkmöglichkeit*, but by a study of intelligence as a function in organic behavior. If we interpret intelligence in this way, many of our problems and their solutions become purely verbal. Moreover, the perennial question of the freedom of the will is then seen to be based on an assumption that is common to both parties to the dispute. An acceptable solution of the puzzle becomes impossible, since we are compelled to choose between a hypostatization of

the will and pure mechanism, without attaining to a genuinely non-mechanical category to give freedom significance and value.

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*Forgiveness and Suffering: A Study of Christian Belief.* By D. WHITE, M. D. Cambridge, University Press, 1913. Pp. xi, 133.

*The Flea.* By H. RUSSELL. Cambridge, University Press; New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913. Pp. vii, 125.

A general account, in untechnical terms, which devotes some space to sense-organs, and discloses the secrets of the performing flea. The statement that "monkeys have no fleas" will be new to most readers.

*Plato: Moral and Political Ideals.* By A. M. ADAM. Cambridge, University Press; New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913. Pp. viii, 159.

A popular outline of Plato's ethical and political doctrine. The author, following the older tradition as against the views of Taylor and Burnet, believes that the greater range of thought in the later works reflects the development of Plato's own mental powers.

*The Individual in the Animal Kingdom.* By J. S. HUXLEY. Cambridge, University Press; New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912. Pp. xi, 167.

Defines an individual as a "continuing whole with interdependent parts"; and seeks to show that living matter always tends to group itself into "closed, independent systems with harmonious parts" which may be identified with the individuals treated of by the philosopher.

*The Meaning of Evolution.* By S. C. SCHMUCKER. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1913. Pp. iv, 298. Price, \$1.50.

*The First Principles of Evolution.* By S. HERBERT. London, A. & C. Black; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1913. Pp. ix, 346. Price, \$2.00.

These are popular books on the doctrine of organic evolution, both of them comprehensive in scope and philosophical in tendency. Professor Schmucker's volume is pleasantly written, but seems to belong to the past generation; Mendel's name, for instance, does not appear. Dr. Herbert's work, the outcome of a series of lectures to working-men, is both fuller and more modern; it is lavishly illustrated, and will be found useful as a compendium of theories. The scientific reader will, perhaps, feel that there is rather too much of theory and will distrust the influence of Bergson; evolution, after all, so far as it is a scientific concept, must be worked out by observation and experiment. Books of this type, however, have a definite sphere of usefulness, and the two volumes before us are good specimens of their class.

*Sadhana: The Realization of Life.* By RADINDRANATH TAGORE. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1913. Pp. xi, 164. Price, \$1.25.

This little volume is made up of eight essays, on the Relation of the Individual to the Universe, Soul Consciousness, the Problem of